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Summary: Over the last decade, Libya has undergone a remarkable international 
transformation, re-establishing commercial and diplomatic relations with the world’s 
leading powers. Domestically, Libya has also attempted to move in new directions; 
unfortunately, internal reforms have not been as speedy or as far-reaching as Libya’s 
international make-over. Several factors have contributed to the sporadic and incomplete 
reforms implemented to date. However, the most significant one remains the gulf that 
exists between the myths, ideas and beliefs of the One September Revolution and the 
social, economic and political realities they profess to explain. Conservative and 
progressive forces in Libya continue to struggle over the direction and pace of internal 
reform, a fight whose outcome will likely influence, if not determine, the eventual 






At the turn of the century, Qaddafi initiated a series of economic reforms. While some 
progress was made, attempts at economic liberalisation too often were hesitant, 
uncoordinated and piecemeal, and the situation looks set to worsen. In mid-February 
2009, the Basic People’s Congresses (BPC) met to consider Qaddafi’s proposal to 
dismantle the central government and distribute oil revenues direct to the public. Less 
than two weeks later, the General People’s Congress (GPC) announced that only 64 of 
the 468 BPC had approved the plan while 153 had opposed it and 251 had endorsed it 
but only after ‘appropriate measures’ had been put in place prior to its execution. 
 
The delay in the implementation of Qaddafi’s plan amounted to a rejection of his attempt 
to shift blame for the country’s economic problems from himself and the ideology in The 
Green Book to a government he has long dominated but belatedly recognised as corrupt 
and inefficient. In any case, the issue was far more complicated than a simple 
unwillingness on the part of the Leader, as Qaddafi likes to be called, to assume 
responsibility for his policies. The success of economic reform in Libya is dependent on a 
broader and deeper role for the state, not its dismantlement. Therefore, the crux of the 
matter is a redefinition of the role of the state, not doing away with it. 
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At the same time, Libyan officials have continued to promote ‘people’s capitalism’, a 
halfway house between socialism and capitalism often described as looking like 
capitalism but acting like socialism. Actually, people’s capitalism is nothing more than a 
crude attempt to mask the obvious differences between the anachronistic ‘socialist’ 
ideology in The Green Book and modern reality. Attempts to rationalise privatisation as 
the ‘extension of popular ownership’ fall in the same category. In the interim, charges of 
inconsistency, lack of transparency and favouritism have continued to dog the reform 
process with most observers agreeing that a strong investment code, contract sanctity 
and the rule of law are among the things required to improve the current business climate. 
 
The mounting political uncertainties which have accompanied lagging economic reforms 
add to expatriate uneasiness and dampen foreign investment. From the outset of the 
internal reform process, many international investors, out of perceived or real necessity, 
tied themselves to a single individual or political faction, often Saif al-Islam al-Qaddafi, the 
Leader’s first son by his second wife and a champion of reform. As the political fortunes of 
Saif and those around him have ebbed and flowed, concern has increased among some 
investors that they picked the wrong sponsor. 
 
Hydrocarbons, the Exception? 
In recent years, the oil and gas sector has generally been viewed as the single positive 
exception to halting reform efforts elsewhere in the Libyan economy. In August 2004, 
Libya announced a new round of exploration and production sharing agreements, EPSA, 
phase four, which offered enhanced incentives for oil and gas exploration in an open, 
competitive bidding environment. Over the next three years, the National Oil Company 
(NOC) concluded four rounds of bidding, awarding 52 contracts to almost three dozen 
companies from some 20 countries. The terms of these contracts were highly competitive 
with the NOC collecting hundreds of millions of dollars in signature bonuses. 
 
Widely considered a success in terms of efficiency and transparency, reforms to the oil 
and gas industry have stalled in recent months and now appear at risk. As oil prices 
declined, Qaddafi threatened to nationalise the hydrocarbon industry, arguing the recent 
slump in oil revenues should prompt oil-producing states to maximise revenues from their 
key resource. While nationalisation itself was never anticipated, the NOC seized on the 
moment to renegotiate existing oil and gas contracts. Over the last two years, it has 
revised contracts with ENI of Italy, Total of France and Repsol of Spain, to name a few, 
reducing their oil take from as much as 49% to less than 20%. 
 
At the same time, the General National Maritime Transport Company of Libya (GNMTC), 
headed by Hannibal Qaddafi –the Leader’s fourth son by his second wife–, has continued 
to exercise a near monopoly on the transport of Libyan oil, concluding the purchase in late 
2008 of six oil tankers valued at US$400 million. Hannibal’s involvement in the lucrative oil 
transport industry is symptomatic of a trend in which the participation of one or more of 
Qaddafi’s children has become increasingly necessary for the success of any large 
project or business deal. The ongoing dispute with the Swiss government and the EU, 
which stems from the alleged mistreatment of Hannibal by Geneva police in July 2008, 
offers further evidence of the degree to which the Leader sees himself and his family as 
inviolable and exempt from accepted standards of behaviour, including norms promoted in 
The Green Book. The early March 2010 diplomatic row with the US over a State 
Department spokesperson’s offhand characterisation of the Leader as a few cards shy of 
a full deck in part falls in the same category. 
 









Unfortunately, things look set to become even more difficult for international companies 
operating in Libya. The government in August 2009 issued a directive that all companies 
working in the country must appoint a Libyan citizen to head up local operations, an 
onerous requirement in the oil and gas sector where 100% of exploration costs are paid 
by the foreign partner. A few weeks later, Shokri Ghanem, the head of the National Oil 
Company, tendered his resignation in a surprise move that signalled a serious policy rift. 
Ghanem was later reinstated but not before a new body, the Supreme Council for Energy 
Affairs (SCEA), was created to oversee the NOC and to regulate the hydrocarbons 
industry. Chaired by the Secretary of the General People’s Committee (Prime Minister), 
the membership of the SCEA includes Muatasim Billah al-Qaddafi, the national security 
adviser and Qaddafi’s third son by his second wife. With Muatasim known for his ties to 
conservative elements and Ghanem an ally of Saif’s progressive movement, there 
remains an open question as to whether the reinstatement of Ghanem represented a 
return to earlier NOC policies or simply an attempt to paper over policy differences. 
 
One indication that oil and gas policy may be under new management came in early 
March 2010 when Ghanem summoned executives from a number of US oil companies 
operating in Libya, including Exxon Mobil, ConocoPhillips, Occidental and Marathon, and 
told them that the current diplomatic row with Washington could have a negative impact 
on all US businesses in the country. This decision to threaten oil company executives 
over an incident completely outside their control is of considerable potential significance 
because Libya for most of the last 40 years has kept hydrocarbon policy in general and 
the NOC in particular isolated from domestic and international controversies. 
 
Given the level of uncertainty clouding the hydrocarbons sector, the abortive sale of 
Verenex Energy Inc., a Canadian oil exploration company, to the state-owned China 
National Petroleum Company (CNPC) caused serious heartburn for oil companies 
operating in Libya, especially the smaller ones. The National Oil Company blocked the 
sale for months on the grounds it enjoyed the right of first refusal and could decide to 
match CNPC’s bid for Verenex. With other holdings in Libya, China proved reluctant to 
challenge the Qaddafi regime and eventually withdrew its offer in September 2009. In the 
meantime, Verenex’s share price slumped over uncertainty as to whether a sale would 
occur, and if so, when and at what price. 
 
When compared to giants like British Petroleum and Exxon Mobil, Verenex is a small 
player in Libya, but it is the only one to have made a large find in the acreage tendered 
after August 2004. Awarded area 47 in Ghadames as part of EPSA, phase 4, round 1, 
Verenex later identified a deposit estimated to hold 2.15 billion barrels of oil. Verenex 
eventually agreed at the end of 2009 to sell to the NOC at 70% of the price originally 
offered by the CNPC after the NOC refused to honour its commitment to match the CNPC 
bid. Libya’s shabby treatment of Verenex has caused other oil companies operating in the 
country to worry that in the event of a significant discovery Libya would also seek to revise 
their contract terms to recover more revenues. It was especially concerning for the smaller 
oil companies because the Libyan approach in 2009 mirrored its strategy in the early 
1970s when it initiated radical new production and pricing policies, beginning with the 
smaller and more vulnerable independent companies. 
 
The Verenex case also offered an illuminating window into why Libya’s mid-term 
production expectations are not being met. A common complaint from international 
companies working in Libya is that its opaque, bureaucratic decision-making system too 
often results in prolonged, less-than-transparent decisions. Foreign oil producers are also 









disappointed at the low rate of new finds in Libya. Therefore, any new efforts to tightened 
terms for oil and gas contracts could easily result in reduced exploration activity, putting at 
risk Libyan plans for production increases. Reflecting the current situation, Shokri 
Ghanem in December 2009 unexpectedly extended the much ballyhooed NOC production 
target of 3 million barrels a day (b/d) by 2012 out five years to 2017. 
 
Social Reform 
Libya remains a largely tribal society operating along informal, cliental lines. Primary 
allegiances are to the family, clan and tribe, and the path to advancement more often than 
not is through nepotism, favouritism and patronage as opposed to performance, merit or 
skill. Basic freedoms, like freedom of speech, assembly and the press, do not exist. In the 
spring of 2009, the state nationalised Saif’s budding media empire, dealing a severe blow 
to what little free press remained. More recently, the Leader defined a free press as one 
owned by the people –ie, the regime–, as opposed to corporations or individuals. 
 
Libya has one of the youngest populations in the Arab world with one in three under 15 
years of age; therefore, the current high rates of unemployment and underemployment, 
especially among youth, will likely increase in coming years. In part, the regime has 
sought to address these problems through the policy of Libyanisation, requiring foreign 
firms to hire Libyans. Similar policies have been implemented elsewhere in the world with 
only limited success. For the policy to work in Libya, both improved education and a new 
work ethos are essential, and neither of these can be expected to materialise in the short 
run. Consequently, Libya continues to recruit tens of thousands of expatriate workers, an 
approach that has led to charges of abuse and mistreatment in the past. 
 
Progress on human rights reform also remains slow and uncertain at best. Ali Mohamed 
al Fakheri, a former CIA detainee better known by his terrorist nom de guerre Ibn al-
Sheikh al-Libi, died in the notorious Abu Salim prison in early May 2009. Officially, he 
committed suicide; however, the tight security commonplace in Libyan prisons makes this 
unlikely. At the other end of the political spectrum, Fathi al-Jahmi, a prominent Libyan 
political dissident and human rights activist, slipped into a coma following a stroke on 4 
May 2009 and later died in Jordan. A tale of two Libyans, both opponents to the Qaddafi 
regime, and both dead directly or indirectly as a result of regime policy. 
 
With Saif in the lead, some recent developments have resulted in pockets of actual or 
potential social reform, offering hope for additional improvements in the future. In late 
November 2009, an official suggested that new legislation, if adopted by the GPC, would 
allow the formation of nongovernmental organisations (NGOs) as long as they were 
apolitical. The same person stated that the penal code might be amended to reduce the 
number of crimes punishable by death from the current 21 to only two: premeditated 
murder and acts of terrorism. Two months later, just as a committee appointed by Saif 
was about to propose laws setting out the new penal code and the formation of NGOs, the 
Leader told the GPC that the concept of a civil society complete with NGOs had no place 
in Libya. In the interim, the Qaddafi International Charity and Development Foundation 
headed by Saif issued its first report cataloguing human rights abuses in Libya and calling 
for the full liberalisation of the media. Saif was also instrumental in organising in mid-















Over the last 40 years, the Qaddafi regime has implemented a long series of political 
reforms in an effort to generate the levels of political mobilisation and participation 
necessary to achieve its goals but to do so within the centralised, authoritarian political 
system necessary for Qaddafi to retain power. In the process, the Leader claims to have 
created a unique form of direct democracy, based on a nationwide system of committees 
and congresses, in which power rests in the hands of the people. In reality, Qaddafi after 
40 years of tinkering, has largely returned the political system to where it was when he 
ousted the Libyan monarchy in 1969. Effective power today rests in the hands of the 
Leader and a few trusted advisors in a system firmly grounded in family ties and tribal 
loyalties and buttressed by the military and various security organisations. 
 
Selected elements of a Western-style, representative democracy are present in the 
Libyan system of direct democracy, but others, like the rule of law, respect for human 
rights and freedom to dissent, are not. Moreover, a thorough reform of the existing system 
of government, to include professionalisation of the military, increased control of security 
institutions by civil society and the state and strengthening the rule of law, is unlikely to 
occur as long as Qaddafi remains in power. Any such reform would destroy the system 
the Leader has spent 40 years constructing and his power base in the process. 
 
In 2004, Saif created a small committee to work with international experts to draft a new 
constitution. Their efforts produced a draft charter of 152 articles which was leaked to the 
press in the spring of 2008. It was then submitted to a legal committee for review under 
the following guidelines: (1) be sensitive to the spirit of The Green Book; (2) acknowledge 
the weakness of a formal system of government and the strength of actors sitting outside 
the formal system; and (3) consider the need for stability in existing bodies of governance. 
These guidelines reinforced the message the draft committee had been given at the 
outset, ie, certain red lines could not be crossed in any constitution –including the role of 
the Leader and the ideology in The Green Book–. Saif later announced that a draft 
constitution would be presented to the GPC in February 2009; however, nothing more has 
been heard of the document. In any case, any future constitution –if one is released– will 
almost surely be more of a social contract, à la Jean-Jacques Rousseau, as opposed to a 
document detailing a working system of representative democracy, including separation of 
powers, checks and balances, political parties and free elections. 
 
In the meantime, the Leader has continued to promote his system of direct democracy as 
the solution to the world’s political ills, decrying multiparty democracy as a system in 
which people are ridden on ‘like donkeys’. In an April 2009 speech to Libyan students, 
Qaddafi proudly proclaimed that one day the world will implement The Green Book, the 
Third Universal Theory and the Jamahiriya system. In a late January 2010 address to the 
GPC, he again reaffirmed his faith in the direct democracy system, arguing that there was 
no alternative to the people’s authority. 
 
Succession Plan or Balancing Act? 
Over the last decade, socioeconomic change has taken place in Libya; however, the full 
extent, eventual direction and real permanence of that change remains unclear. Libyan 
officials have become expert in tossing about terms such as partnership, accountability 
and transparency, but the reality on the ground is a reform process implemented in an ad 
hoc, opaque manner with its pace and effectiveness often compromised by ideological 
constraints. A small group of progressives led by Saif continue to advocate reform, but 
they have met determined opposition every step of the way from hard line elements 









opposed to any change that might move Libya away from a highly centralised, 
authoritarian political system. Old guard elements view the introduction of a private sector 
economy and a more open political system as a threat to their economic interests and to 
the patronage networks underpinning the existing political framework. 
 
In the uncertain and shifting dynamics of Libyan politics, it appeared throughout much of 
2009 that Saif was losing power and influence while Muatasim was ascendant. In August 
2008, Saif announced he was retiring from political life, and while Saif met Secretary of 
State Condoleezza Rice in November 2008, it was Muatasim who met Secretary of State 
Hillary Clinton in April 2009. Moreover, about the time Muatasim was appointed national 
security adviser, his mentor, Musa Kusa, was appointed Foreign Minister. Both Muatasim 
and Kusa are allied with the more conservative elements in Libya. The demise of Saif’s 
budding media empire and the cancellation of a planned visit to Washington DC in the 
summer of 2009 also suggested his political fortunes were in decline. 
 
Some commentators have argued that Saif’s visible role in freeing Abdel Basset al-
Megrahi, the only person convicted in the bombing of Pan Am flight 103, suggested his 
political star was again on the rise, and while this may have been the case, it is more 
likely a misreading of Megrahi’s return. When his plane arrived in Tripoli, there were no 
Libyan government officials at the airport to meet Megrahi and the Leader did not greet 
him until the following day. Therefore, it is highly likely that the Libyans thought they were 
complying, at least in part, with the wishes of Western governments for a low-key return 
for Megrahi when Saif, not a member of the government at the time, was the only notable 
Libyan prominently involved in his return home. 
 
In any case, most observers were surprised when the Leader in mid-October 2009 asked 
senior officials to find an official position ‘with no term limit’ for Saif. The next day, Saif 
was appointed head of the organising committee of the People’s Social Leadership 
Committees (also found as Social Popular Leadership Committees), a body introduced by 
the Leader in 1994 which brings together heads of tribes and social institutions. In the 
past, these committees generally have been headed by senior military people, and while 
their exact powers, functions and influence remain unclear, their primary task appears to 
be to maintain social stability and regime control of the constituent groups. With some 
observers describing Saif’s new job as the second most powerful position in the country, 
his appointment was widely interpreted in the West as a succession signal; however, it is 
far too early to reach that conclusion. Five months later, Saif has yet to accept the 
proffered role, arguing he cannot accept any position in the government until Libya adopts 
democratic institutions, a new constitution and transparent elections. 
 
If and when Saif agrees to head the organising committee of the People’s Social 
Leadership Committees, it will be a highly significant political event as it will mark the first 
time that he has occupied an official government position. As Libya took steps to rejoin 
the international community, Saif served in the past as an unofficial envoy for the Leader, 
and his back channels of communication with Western leaders were often the only game 
in town. Following the establishment of full relations with the world’s powers, times 
changed and the rules of the game altered. Today, states expect to deal with the Libyan 
government through Libyan officials and official channels of communication, not through 
the back channels earlier required. Throughout this transition period, Saif has continued to 
head the Qaddafi International Charity and Development Foundation, but he has held no 
formal government job prior to his pending appointment to the People’s Social Leadership 









Committees. In contrast, Muatasim held important posts in the army before becoming 
national security adviser two years ago. 
 
Conclusion: The appointment of Saif to the People’s Social Leadership Committees, 
together with Shokri Ghanem’s reappointment to the NOC, appear to have been an 
attempt on the part of the Leader to balance the competing political forces that are 
hamstringing reform efforts as opposed to a definitive succession signal. Qaddafi has 
employed similar tactics throughout his four decades in power, and based on history, a 
swing of the pendulum could immediately reverse the current power dynamics at any 
future point. As for the Leader, Qaddafi appears to embrace the Middle East model of 
dynastic succession, but at 67 years of age he is relatively young for an Arab leader. With 
no apparent plans for retirement, he can be expected to continue his efforts to balance 
conservative and progressive elements in Libya in order to maintain his own power 
position and to keep his succession options open. 
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